Pelham in the Maryland Campaign - Part I: Prelude to Antietam
It began as a campaign full of promise. The Army of Northern Virginia had soundly defeated John Pope at Second Manassas, August 28-30, 1862. After a clash at Chantilly on September 1st, the Federals huddled around the outer defenses of Washington. John Pope was sent packing west and the Lincoln administration, with great reluctance, recalled George B. McClellan to command the army.
The initiative, however, was Lee’s. For the first time since the beginning of the war no Federal force of any significance occupied Virginia. Great Britain was on the verge of recognizing the Confederacy. Marylanders, so it was believed, sympathized with the Confederacy and were anxious to throw off the Federal yoke. A Confederate victory on Northern soil might end the war. Perhaps a more practical reason spurred the invasion – Lee’s army could not be fed in the desolate region around Manassas, and Lee was unwilling to withdraw to the Rappahannock.1
The Confederates crossed White’s Ford on the Potomac from September 4-7. The cavalry crossed the 5th. Heros von Borcke of Stuart’s staff captured the drama of the crossing: “It was…a magnificent sight as the long column of many thousand horseman stretched across this beautiful Potomac. The evening sun slanted upon its clear placid waters, burnished them with gold, while the arms of the soldiers glittered and blazed in its radiance. There were few moments, perhaps, from the beginning to the close of the War, of excitement more intense, of exhilaration more delightful, than when we ascended the opposite bank of the familiar but now strangely thrilling music of ‘Maryland, My Maryland’.”
In high spirits, despite the surprisingly chilly reception by the Marylanders, the infantry concentrated at Frederick. Stuart, after a brush with Pleasonton at Poolesville, established cavalry headquaters at Urbana. Camp was made in the yard of the Cockey family. Stuart was vigilant, but all he had to do was wait for the Federal army to move. He indulged in a respite from fhe demands of war and he and his men enjoyed the hospitality of the neighborhood and the ladies in particular. "Stuart," said an envious Henry Kyd Douglas, "was ready to see and to talk with every good-looking woman." Besides, the merely curious and Southern sympathizers were disappointed in the absence of the Confederate brass. Lee had broken his hand during a fall; Longstreet was nursing a blistered foot; and Jackson, after a fall from his horse, was being his usual reticent self. It remained for Stuart to do the social honors.
Typically, Stuart planned a ball on the 8th. Von Borcke hastily found an unused female academy hall, which he had decorated with roses and battle flags. The 18th Mississippi, Barksdale's Brigade, provided the band. As Stuart, Von Borcke, Pelham and the staff danced, the festivities were rudely interrupted by gunfire. The cavalry outposts were driven in. The hall was cleared and the soldiers took care of the little emergency. The dance then resumed, but when the wounded were brought in the festivities ended. The ladies became makeshift nurses.
The lull had ended and events began to move quickly. When Lee had invaded Maryland it was assumed that the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry would be withdrawn. This did not happen. Not only did Lee want its valuable arsenal, but its fall was necessary to establish communications in the Shenandoah Valley. To capture the arsenal, Lee dispatched Jackson, with his three divisions, and those of McLaw's and Walker's, to Harpers Ferry on the 10th. D. H. Hill’s division was to occupy Boonsboro and close up any escape hatch. Longstreet was ordered to march to Hagerstown when it was rumored a Federal force was advancing on it.
This was, of course, a dangerous division of the army. Lee, however, optimistically expected Harpers Ferry to fall by the 13th; certainly no later than the 14th. At Hagerstown the army would reconcentrate. Then, with the slow marching McClellan still behind, the Confederates would plant their battle flags along the Susquehanna....
Almost immediately the timetable fell apart. On the 13th Stuart, who was holding off Pleasonton's cavalry east of the Catoctin range, was pushed back by the Federals. He retired via Middletown to Boonsboro. He was apparently hard pressed, as his chief of artillery, Major John Pelham, was captured. The incident is obscure, and von Borcke, who mentioned it, wrote: "Here [at Boonsboro] we were greatly distressed at learning that ... Major Pelham, who had marched with Fitz Lee, had been cut off, and was a prisoner in the enemy's hands. He turned up, however, the next morning, having cut his way through the Yankee lines, and saved himself by his never-failing coolness and intrepidity."
Stuart was not very concerned about his withdrawal, being under the impression that if Harpers Ferry had not fallen, it soon would. He, of course, informed Lee and also informed D.H. Hill to occupy Turner's Gap, a gap in a ridge west of the Catoctin called South Mountain. Across Turner's Gap ran an important highway, the old National Road. As an added precaution and without informing D.H. Hill, he ordered Rosser with the 5th Virginia Cavalry and Pelham's battery to occupy Braddock's or Fox's Gap, about one mile south of Turner's. The old Sharpsburg Road passed through this gap.
In response to Stuart's warning, D.H. Hill sent one of his brigades, that of Col. A.H. Colquitt, to occupy Turner's Gap. Hill was not worried -- he believed the Federal force was just cavalry. His main concern was to his south and the roads leading to Harpers Ferry. His division was mostly concentrated in Boonsboro, with only Garland's brigade ready to ascend the mountain. However, on the night of the 13th, Colquitt sent a dispatch to Hill stating that far too many enemy campfires were lit to be only a small enemy force in his front. If this were true, and with Lee's army still divided, a stand must be made at South Mountain. Lee ordered Hill to cooperate with Stuart in holding the mountain passes. Longstreet was called from Hagerstown. Stuart, however, had gone southward to Crampton's Gap, believing the main enemy threat would be there.
At dawn on the 14th, Hill became aware of his ignorance of the ground, having done no previous reconnaissance. Colquitt's brigade was still the only one on the mountain, although Gar1and's was coming up. Hill and an aide rode along the terrain and had barely gone a mile when they were shocked to hear the rumbling of artillery and voices -- the Federals were not only on the mountain, but near its crest! 2 Colquitt was to hold Turner's Gap; Garland to hold Fox's Gap.
The Federal force Hill was facing were two brigades of the Kanawha Division, commanded by General Jacob D. Cox, of the Ninth Corps. He moved against Hillis right flank, his goal to seize the gap. At 7:30 a.m. he began the ascent, and at 9 a.m. struck Rosser's cavalry. In this assault, by the way, was Rutherford B. Hayes of the 73rd Ohio, later President of the United States, who was wounded.
Samuel Garland arrived to find Rosser's men dismounted behind a stone fence with his men and artillery already engaged. Garland's brigade of roughly 1,000 men was composed of North Carolinians, many who had never been in battle. Garland conferred with Rosser and set up a defensive position: what followed was a confused, close hand-to-hand battle. Garland himself was mortally wounded. Without their chief, panic occurred and the North Carolinians broke. Casualties were high and the Federals captured many prisoners. The remainder of the brigade tried to rally, but the fugit ives ran toward Turner's Gap. D.H. Hill had called up the brigade of G.B. Anderson for support. Even couriers, cooks and staff officers joined the fray.
Hill's situation was desperate. Then, at 11 a.m. the impossible happened -- the firing died down. Cox was satisfied with the possession of Fox's Gap; his troops, after their long hard climb and fight, were exhausted. He would wait for the rest of the Ninth Corps. D.H. Hill did not deserve such luck. Hi s reinforcements -- Anderson, Rodes and Ripley -- arrived on the field. Longstreet's men also began to arrive. At 2 p.m. the Ninth Corps assaulted again. The Confederate defense was incompetently directed. Only the arrival of Hood's Texans won the field at nightfall. One notable casualty on the Federal side was that of Major General Jesse Reno, commander of the Ninth Corps.
Meanwhile, southward to Crampton's Gap, another battle had been in progress. The Federal Sixth Corps, under Franklin, had been held at bay. Lee realized, however, that he did not have the force to hold off another Federal assault at South Mountain. Harpers Ferry had not yet fallen. The army was still divided. The jig was up! The campaign was over, a withdrawal was necessary. Lee sent the following dispatch to McLaws: "General: The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon your position [and] ...ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac.... "
McClellan had apparently won. He had seized the initiative. On the 13th he had had the good fortune of finding a copy of Lee's orders, disclosing the divided state of the army. With this information in hand, for some unaccountable reason, he delayed his attacks against South Mountain until the early morning of the 14th. Yet it appeared he had been successful in defeating Lee.
However, luck was still with Lee. At midnight, just as Lee had written the dispatch and sent it by courier to McLaws, a horseman arrived from Jackson. Harpers Ferry woul d be surrendered by the Federals tomorrow, September 15th! Lee's fighting blood was up. It was a desperate gamble, but perhaps the campaign was not over. Perhaps fruits could still be garnered. McLaws orders were cancelled; Jackson was told to march with all expediency towards Sharpsburg. The army would indeed concentrate at the small town -- not to retreat across the Potomac, but to stand and fight along the banks of a creek soon to be famous in military annals -- the steep banks of the Antietam.
1 Lee's reasons for the invasion are outlined in Freeman, R.E. Lee, pp. 350-353.
This article first appeared in Volume 2, No. 5 of The Cannoneer.
Sources:
"The Battle of Antietam," Civil War Times Illustrated, August
1962.
Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, New
Haven and New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1983.
Jacob D. Cox, "The Battle of Antietam," Battles and Leaders of
the Civil War, Volume 2, pp. 630-660.
D. H. Hill, "The Battle of South Mountain," Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War, Volume 2, pp. 559-581.
H. B. McClellan, I Rode with Jeb Stuart.
Jennings C. Wise, The Long Arm of Lee, Lynchburg: J. P. Bell &
Co., Volumes 1 and 2, 1915.
Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, Vol. 2.
Charles G. Milham, Gallant Pelham: American Extraordinary.
