The Cavalry in the 2nd Manassas Campaign

July, 1862, found the cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia resting near Hanover Court House. The horses grazed in the Hanover countryside, building up strength, while for the first time many cavalrymen were being trained in maneuver and drills were held daily. Reorganization was a top Priority: on July 28th, the cavalry was organized into two brigades. The first, commanded by Wade Hampton, consisted of the 1st North Carolina, the Cobb Legion, the Jeff Davis Legion, the Hampton Legion, and the 10th Virginia Cavalry. The second brigade, commanded by Fitz Lee, consisted of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 9th Virginia Cavalry regiments. Stuart himself received his promotion to Major General on the 25th.

With McClellan remaining fairly inactive at Harrison's Landing, Lee felt it safe to detach Jackson to Gordonsville to observe a new Federal army. This army, consisting of approximately 50,000 men, were commanded by General John Pope. Pope was from out west where he boasted that they had only seen the hindquarters of their enemy; the army was not to worry about such things as lines of communication or bases of supply. Pope's army threatened the Virginia Central Railroad. Another Federal army under Burnside was at Fredericksburg. It was obvious to Lee that these armies should not be allowed to converge, lest he be overwhelmed.

Federal cavalry also threatened the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad. They penetrated as far as Beaver Dam Station, where John S. Mosby, waiting for his train, was captured. On August 4th, Stuart with Pelham's horse artillery, struck the enemy at Massaponax Church, capturing 85 prisoners, 11 wagons and teams, and 15 horses. The expedition was only partially successful.

Meanwhile, on August 9th, Jackson won a victory over Banks at Cedar Mountain. On the 11th, it became obvious that most of McClellan' s army was abandoning its position in front of Richmond; Longstreet was detached on the 13th to Gordonsville.

When Lee arrived, he was aware that Pope had placed his army in a precarious situation. His army was between the "V" formed by the junction of the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers. If Lee could send his cavalry behind the lines at Rappahannock Station, interrupt his communications and supplies, and if Lee could coordinate an assault beyond the Rapidan at the same time, Pope could be destroyed. Lee had to strike Pope before he became alert to his danger and put the Rappahannock between them. He decided to cross the Rapidan the 17th and give battle the next day.

Stuart's orders called for Fitz Lee to be in position at Raccoon Ford on the Rapidan on the 17th, where they would cross. Wade Hampton's command was still in front of Richmond and not share in the opening phase of the new campaign. However, as often happens, either from a mixup of orders or a failure on Stuart's part to emphasize the need for speed, Fitz Lee did not hurry to Raccoon Ford. He started his march from Beaver Dam, 37 miles away. But his men were out of provisions, so he moved first to Louisa Court House, where he issued rations and ammunition. From this point, his march to the Rapidan was 62 miles, which he could not possibly do in one day.

Stuart, of course, was unaware of this as he and his staff slept on a farmhouse porch near the small hamlet of Verdiersville (the soldiers called it ''My Dearsville"). The local citizens had seen no Confederate cavalry in the area that day. Puzzled, Stuart sent his adjutant, Norman Fitz Hugh, to investigate. Fitz Hugh was captured by a party of enemy cavalry, along with orders outlining Lee's plans. At daybreak, August 18th, Stuart was awakened by the sound of approaching horsemen. Fitz Lee at last! He walked out to the road and saw two of his staff hotly pursued by enemy cavalry. It was all they could do to get to their horses and make their escape. Stuart watched as the Yankees took his famous hat with its plume, which was left on the porch. He put a red bandana over his head to protect himself from the sun and bore the jibes of cavalrymen. Wrote Stuart: "I am greeted on all sides with congratulations and 'Where's your hat?' I intend to make the Yankees pay for that that."

Such an incident added much to the Stuart legend, but in reality Fitz Lee's failure to reach Raccoon Ford was not the deciding factor in delaying Lee's crossing of the Rapidan. Lee himself was forced to postpone the movement before he knew that Fitz Lee would not arrive. The failure was one of organization: the army had not yet learned the difficult art of coordination of all arms of the service. Pope had become aware of his danger and crossed the Rappahannock. On the 20th, Lee crossed the Rapidan without incident.

For several days, Lee and Pope played a cat-and-mouse game along the Rappahannock; Lee searching for a crossing, Pope denying him one. Fitz Lee was directed to cover the front and right of Longstreet's advance. Stuart went with Beverly Robertson's cavalry in advance of Jackson, encountering the enemy between Stevensburg and Brandy Station. Stuart drove them to the river, where Federal batteries posted on the north side opened up. Fitz Lee and Pelham, summoned from Kelly's Ford, came up in support, but the Federals crossed the river unpunished.

To break the deadlock, Lee approved Stuart's plan to strike Pope's communications at Catlett's Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Stuart crossed at Waterloo Bridge on August 22nd. Apparently, Pelham did not go on this raid, but some of the horse artillery did. Stuart reached Auburn, via Warrenton, that night and was in the midst of the enemy's encampments. A thunderstorm broke and the night was so dark that men could scarcely see the horse in front of them. Fortunately, Stuart met a black man who had known him from Berkeley County. This man offered to guide Stuart's men to Pope's headquarters. Pope was gone, but the 9th Virginia Cavalry assaulted the camp, capturing Pope's uniform and his staff's papers. Meanwhile, Captain W. W. Blackford attempted to destroy the railroad bridge over Cedar Run. But it was raining too hard, the axes made no headway, and the enemy opened up fire from a cliff beyond. Stuart admitted that he could not destroy the railroad bridge and recrossed the Rappahannock on the 23rd. Pope's uniform was sent to Richmond and for a long time was on display in a store window on Main Street. Stuart got his vengeance for the loss of his hat and plume, but more important were the papers he had captured.

Lee learned that Pope had 45,000 men on August 20th and that he did not reinforce Burnside at Fredericksburg, as Lee had supposed. He also learned that Pope intended to hold the line along the Rappahannock until reinforced by McClellan. Porter's Corps was already on the way. This junction Lee could not allow. He had to draw Pope further away from McClellan. Once again, he would attempt to interrupt the enemy's communications and perhaps place his army between Pope and Washington.

Lee ordered Jackson to go up the Rappahannock, find a crossing, get in rear of Pope's army and cut his communications. Where it was to be done and the line of advance, Lee left to Jackson. This kind of semi-independent operation appealed to Jackson. With 32,000 men, consisting of the divisions of Ewell, Taliaferro and A. P. Hill, Jackson crossed the river at Henson's Mill on the 25th. That night Jackson reached Salem -- a march that did the "foot cavalry" proud. Stuart went to Lee's headquarters and received orders to support Jackson's advance and to take all the cavalry with him.

The cavalry caught up with Jackson at Gainesville. The 2nd Virginia, under Colonel Thomas Munford, acted as the advance. It was his job to take Bristoe Station. This he easily did, but a train of cars escaped down the tracks before Munford could obstruct them, and it was feared the engineer would give warning and the rich stores at Manassas Junction would be destroyed. Late as the hour was, and the fact that the troops had marched more than 25 miles that day, General Issac R. Trimble, with the 21st North Carolina and 21st Georgia Infantry, volunteered to march on to the Junction, 4-5 miles away. To expedite the movement, Jackson ordered Stuart, with a portion of the cavalry, to accompany Trimble. As senior officer, Stuart took command. The cavalry arrived first, but Stuart felt it best to await Trimble before attacking. At day light the Junction was taken with little trouble, but Trimble seemed reluctant to acknowledge that the cavalry gave him any help at all. Later, an ugly controversy developed between the two generals.

Leaving Ewell at Bristoe, the rest of Jackson's men reached Manassas Junction, his famished men raiding the abundant supplies and food found there. A gallant attack by General G. W. Taylor's New Jersey brigade was made with great vigor. The Confederate infantry lay concealed behind the hills to the left of the junction. The Federal brigade, deployed in line of battle at the eastern side of the plain, began to move forward. Pelham's battery¹ opened up fire. Still the New Jersey men came on, maintaining their line. About half way, they discovered the presence of Confederate infantry. The odds were overwhelming and General Taylor himself was mortally wounded. That evening Jackson's men stripped everything from Manassas Junction. Pelham was placed in charge of captured artillery. Everything not carried away was burned.

Jackson decided to stay as close as possible to Lee's and Longstreet's line of advance near Thoroughfare Gap. He would need to be in a position to strike if opportunity offered or retreat quickly if necessary. He began to search for high defensible ground. He found it at a small hamlet called Groveton, not far from the first battlefield of Manassas. After some confusion in marching orders, Jackson reached Groveton the night of August 27-28th. Captured orders revealed that Pope was concentrating in an effort to destroy Jackson's isolated force. At Groveton Jackson took position along an unfinished railroad cut. Heavy woods concealed his position from the Warrenton Turnpike. On August 28th several Union forces went up this turnpike, only to turn southeastward toward Manassas. Near sunset, another Federal force was observed marching up the Turnpike, but they did not turn toward Manassas. What happened next was described by W. W. Blackford of Stuart's staff:

"Jackson rode out to examine the approaching foe, trotting backwards and forwards along the line of the handsome parade marching by ... but they did not seem to think that a single horseman was worthy of their attention -- how little they thought that this single, plainly dressed horseman was the great Stonewall himself, who was then deliberating in his own mind the question of hurling his eager troops upon their devoted heads....Many of our Generals and Colonels...were watching Jackson's every movement with intense interest, for we could almost tell his thoughts by his movements. Some-times he would halt, then trot on briskly, halt again, wheel his horse and pass again along the front of the marching column....All felt sure Jackson could never resist the temptation, and that the order to attack would come soon, even if Longstreet was beyond the mountain. Presently General Jackson pulled up suddenly, wheeled and galloped toward us. 'Here he comes, by God,' said several, and Jackson rode up to the assembled group as calm as a May morning and touching his hat in military salute, said in as soft a voice as if he had been talking to a friend in ordinary conversation, 'Bring up your men, gentlemen."'

The Federal force marching up the Warrenton Turnpike was the now famous Iron Brigade, under the command of General John Gibbon. They were westerners -- Wisconsin and Indiana men -- distinguished by the black hats they wore. These men had been marched and countermarched all day; they were tired and in no mood for any opposition. Gibbon saw the solitary horseman on the ridge and an annoying battery opened fire upon him: simply a contingent of Stuart's horse artillery, he thought.² He continued his march. Suddenly, Taliaferro's division, two brigades of Ewell and Trimble, with loud cheers, led the assault. Three batteries opened fire. Gibbon wheeled to meet the attack, supported by artillery and Doubleday. Neither side would yield, as the fight reached the orchard of the Brawner farm. Confederate artillery was forced to shift ground. Jackson called up for more, but only Pelham, with two pieces, arrived to meet his need. That evening the Federals retired slowly. It was a costly battle for Jackson. Casualties were high; worse, both Taliaferro and Ewell, seasoned commanders had been wounded. By striking Gibbon, Jackson had revealed his position. Pope knew where he was now. Longstreet had not arrived and Jackson had risked annihilation. However, had he waited, doubtless McClellan would have arrived in time to reinforce Pope. Jackson took the gamble. He prepared for the next day, his men hugging the railroad cut. The major weakness of his line was in his center and left center, where thick woods in the midst of the Confederate lines offered possible avenues of advance.

On August 29th, the enemy made a move toward Sudley Hill. Pelham opened fire on the advance for over an hour, and then was ordered to report to Jackson. Jackson showed him the ground and gave him discretionary orders to place his battery wherever needed -- a high honor from Stonewall! That day the Federals made only some progress against A. P. Hill's line. A gap of about 125-175 yards existed between the brigades of Gregg and Thomas. The heavy foliage in that sector did not allow for the use of artillery. In the afternoon, Hill's men faced determined assaults; the gallant South Carolinians were forced to give ground. Maxcy Gregg, their commander, reached a ridge and would retire no more. "Let us die here, my men, let us die here. Do you want to live forever?" he exhorted. When ammunition ran out, some of Hill's men threw rocks and used the butts of their muskets. Reinforcements by Early arrived and won back the ground Gregg had lost. Soon word reached the men that Longstreet had arrived on the field. At sunset, the Federals threatened Jackson's trains and ambulances; Pelham once again was there, earning Jackson's praise.

The cavalry that day had been guarding both flanks. Stuart met with Lee and Longstreet at Haymarket, bringing Lee up-to-date on what had happened to Jackson, and protected Longstreet' s advance from any Federal threat from Warrenton. When Longstreet arrived on the field, he insisted on examining the ground and did not attack immediately.

Pope actually believed the Confederates were retreating on the 30th. His attacks were poorly coordinated. In the late afternoon the entire Confederate army counter-attacked. Unlike the piecemeal assaults at Gaines's Mill or Malvern Hill, the whole right went in simultaneously. Despite minor delays and obstacles, the whole army swept forward. Darkness and a determined Federal stand at Henry Hill ended the advance. Roberton's cavalry was sent in pursuit over Bull Run. The Federals, though defeated, were not routed and did not display the panic of a year earlier.

A pouring down rain made life miserable for both pursuers and pursued. At Chantilly, on September 1st, Pope made a brief stand. He moved to the protection of Washington and was quickly removed from command. McClellan, who certainly had not moved expeditiously to support Pope, was reluctantly given back his old command by Lincoln. Pope went out to the west.

Stuart's cavalry was ever in the vanguard. They took Fairfax Court House, where Wade Hampton finally joined up. At Flint Hill, two miles north of Fairfax, Hampton and Pelham drove in the Federal cavalry. The Confederate cavalry even entered Falls Churchs, right at the outskirts of Washington, D. C. , where Pelham opened fire on Barrett's Hill.

Lee could have been forgiven a small boast when he wrote Jefferson Davis:

The Army today achieved on the plains of Manassas a signal victory over combined forces of Genls. McClellan and Pope. On the 28th and 29th each wing under Genls. Longstreet and Jackson repulsed with valour attacks made on them separately. We mourn the loss of our gallant dead in every conflict yet our gratitude to Almighty God for his mercies rises higher and higher each day, to Him and to the valour of our troops a nation's gratitude is due.

In three short weeks, the Army of Northern Virginia had advanced from a defensive position near Richmond to the banks of the Potomac! As they crossed that river, expectations were high. The bands played, and the men sang, , 'Maryland, My Maryland!"

¹ Douglas Southall Freeman in Lee's Lieutenants , Vol. 2, p. 97, credits Poague's and Carpenter's batteries with opening fire on the New Jersey brigade. The infantry were upset at the artillery for opening up fire too soon. Freeman also says that WiIliam C. Oates, The War Between the Union and the Confederacy p. 136, blamed the horse artillery. Gen. R.L.T. Beale in his History of the Ninth Virginia Cavalry, p. 34, definitely says that Pelham's battery opened up fire.

² Actually, it was from Wooding's and Balthis' batteries. Alan T. Nolan, The Iron Brigade, Macmillan Co.,1961, p. 321.

-- by Peggy Vogtsberger

This article first appeared in Volume 7, No. 6 of The Cannoneer.