The Chambersburg Raid
Stuart's raid to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania was no grandstand play, but a carefully planned and skilled reconnaissance to obtain vital infotmation for General Robert E. Lee. It was Lee himself who directed the operation, and in orders to Stuart issued October 8, 1862, spelled out his mission in some detail, but left the return route to Stuart's discretion. Stuart was to gain all information of the position, force, and probable intention of the enemy. He was to destroy an important railroad bridge at Scotland, a few miles north of Chambersburg, was authorized to destroy public property, seize horses and supplies as needed, and take hostage Federal, state and local officials. This practice was started by General John Pope during the Second Manassas campaign, and the Confederates wished to reply in kind.
Stuart's expedition interrupted an idyllic life at cavalry headquarters, located at 'The Bower,' the home of Colonel Adam Stephen Dandridge in Jefferson County. Mr: Dandridge not only offered the hospitality of his home, but the delightful company of several unmarried daughters and nieces. Life at 'The Bower' had been full of romance, and an endless series of balls, charades and theatrics.
Stuart issued orders for 1800 specially selected men-- men only with the best mounts (the worn down condition of Heros von Borcke's horses excluded him from this adventure) to rendezvous at Darkesville on October 9th. Commanders in the expedition were Colonel W.H.F. ('Rooney' ) Lee, Colonel William E. ('Grumble') Jones, and Brigadier-General Wade Hampton. Four guns of the Stuart Horse Artillery under Major John Pelham accompanied the column. At noon, the command left Darkesville and reached Hedgesville that night where they encamped.
At dawn, Friday, October 10th, Lieutenant H.R. Phillips of the 10th Virginia Cavalry, wlth 25 men, and a scouting party under Lieutenant Robert Shiver drove in the Federal picket at McCoy's Ferry on the Potomac. Colonel Matthew C. Butler's 2nd South Carolina Cavalry plunged into the river and secured the ford, followed by the rest of Hampton's men, Jones and Lee. The Confederates reached the old National Turnpike. Near McCoy's, citizens informed Stuart that he had just missed a large Federal force, which had been at Clear Spring, Maryland and was enroute to Cumberland. Butler actually captured about 10 men of this party, and learned that they were six regiments of Ohio troops under General Jacob D. Cox, who was enroute to Kanawha, via Cumberland. Stuart wired this important information to Lee. A party of 20 men were sent to capture the Federal signal station at Fairview Heights. Only two officers escaped. Unimpeded, Stuart continued his march, using the mountains to screen his cavalry, and crossed into Pennsylvania.
Once the Confederates crossed the border, they became horse thieves. They were helped by a steady, drizzling rain, which led local farmers to keep their horses in. A central 'division' of 600 men moved out along either side of the road, collecting horses, drawn by the constant hum. of threshers.
Reaching the town of Mercersburg, local merchants were cleared of boots and shoes. It was not until they received receipts for payment did local citizens realize the true identity of their visitors. Hearing that a local citizen had an excellent map of Franklin County, W.W. Blackford of Stuart's staff went to get it. The inhabitants, all female, indignantly refused to let him have it. Wrote Blackford: 'Angry women do not show to advantage, and the language and looks of these were fearful, as I coolly cut the map out of its rollers and put it in my haversack. Five miles north of Mercersburg, the command halted to get corn. We took corn right from the field,' wrote Channing Price, 'having no trouble about a quartermaster buying forage.'
The calvacade reached Chambersburg about 8 p.m. The rain, which had been a steady drizzle, was now a downpour. Stuart sent out a scouting party, and set up his artillery under Pelham about a mile west of the town. Lieutenant Paul Hamilton, Hampton's aide (some accounts say Lieutenant Thomas Lee) headed the party to demand the surrender of the town. They were met by Judge F.M. Kimmell and Colonel A.K. McClure. McClure later wrote that the aide was a 'clever-looking butternut, dripping wet, without any mark of rank, bearing a dirty white cloth on a little stick....He refused to give his name, or the name of the general commanding and he could not state on what terms they would accept a surrender.' When McClure met General Hampton, he told him that the town was undefended. Hampton replied 'in a respectful and soldier-like manner' that he wished no unnecessary loss of life or private property, but all United States property he would use or destroy at his pleasure. He assured McClure that Federal wounded found in hospitals would be paroled. McClure went to his home. He was able to break open his liquor stock before the thirsty rebels arrived, but was too late to save his own horses.
Meanwhile the Confederates busily cut telegraph wires, but Governor Andrew Curtin was able to wire Secretary of War Stanton from Harrisburg: 'THE PEOPLE HAVE SURRENDERED CHAMBERSBURG,' thus giving the Federals a clue as to Stuart's whereabouts. Colonel Butler was authorized to go to the town bank, but some enterprising citizen had already removed the cash. Meanwhile, 'Grumble' Jones was sent on the all-important mission of destroying the railroad over Conococheague Creek. Much to his dismay, the bridge was made of iron, and he could not destroy it. That night, after setting up security around the town, Stuart spent a fitful night sleeping at the tollhouse of the city. He woke up three times, worrying about the rain, now coming down in torrents. Would the river rise before they could get back? Could the Potomac be forded?
At dawn, October 11th, Stuart had his men in the saddle. They broke into the town's depots and helped themselves to Federal overcoats, socks, underwear, and captured 5000 rifles, pistols, sabres and small arms. Butler remained behind to burn the depots. Giving the deliberate impression that he was. heading toward Gettysburg, Stuart started his march in that direction. The seizure of hostages and horses began again until they reached the Maryland border.
Having gone a little way, Stuart called for Blackford, his engineer and aide. Stuart wished to explain his motives in choosing the route back to Virginia. He said that Cox's command, which he had bypassed on the 10th, doubtless would have been ordered to halt and wait for Stuart's return. The Federals would expect him to return the way he came -- the route was shorter and the fords plentiful. Instead, Stuart would go a much longer route. Blackford told Stuart that he understood and approved of his reasons. 'I felt much touched by this mark of confidence,' Blackford wrote, 'and both his eyes and mine filled as we closed the conversation and began a march which for length, speed and boldness has few equals in cavalry annals.'
Stuart now drove his men hard -- there would be no rest until they reached the Potomac and crossed safely into Virginia. Reaching Cashtown, he turned sharply southward. Crossing into Maryland, the seizure of all property ceased, as the Confederates were still trying to court that state. At Emmittsburg, which they reached near sunset, the Confederates were met with sympathy. Women brang food to the weary men, who only halted long enough to feed their mounts. Here, too, Stuart received information that he had just missed a few companies of Rush's Lancers, the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, who were enroute to cut him off at Gettysburg. A few miles south of Emmittsburg, at Rocky Ridge, dispatches were captured from a courier enroute to the Lancers. Stuart learned that the Federals were at Frederick and that the command of Alfred Pleasanton, about 800 men, were approaching Mechanicstown (now Thurmont), only four miles west of Rocky Ridge.
Darkness now descended over the column, and it was still 40 miles to the river. The remainder of the march became a test of endurance for both man and beast. Wrote Blackford: 'It is no small tax upon one's endurance to remain marching all night; during the day there is always something to attract the attention and amuse, but at night there is nothing. The monotonous jingle of arms and accourtrements mingles with the tramp of horses feet into a drowsy hum all along the marching column, which makes one extremely sleepy, and to be sleepy and not to be allowed to sleep is exquisite torture. Only thirst, with water in sight but out of reach, is so bad ... Many of the men went fast to sleep on their horses and snores loud and long could be heard all along the column, which stretched for five miles. In the van was the 1st Virginia Cavalry, under Captain F.W. Southall and Captain C.R. Irving. Pelham, with two guns under Captain James Breathed in advance, rode with the two officers to keep them company. For a while Stuart rode with them until the pace of the march was established. Through the small Maryland villages of Woodsboro, Libertytown, New London, and New Market the march continued. Citizens also gave the disquieting news that General George Stoneman with 4000-5000 men commanded at Poolesville, guarding the fords.
As they passed through New Market, Stuart remembered that a side road led to the town of Urbanna, where just a month ago he had staged a 'Welcome to Maryland' ball. 'Blackford,' he called out, , how would you like to see the 'New York rebel' I tonight?' Blackford, Stuart and a few others of the staff left the main column to pay their visit to the ladies, which did not last long, and returned to, the main column as it reached Hyattstown, at dawn of the 12th. It was still 12 miles to the Potomac.
Here the services of Captain B.S. White, a native of Poolesville, became invaulable. Stoneman would probably expect Stuart to cross the ford at the mouth of the Monocacy River, known as Noland's, for a quick dash into Virginia; if Stuart chose a longer route, most likely he would stay on the main road, via Barnesville, Beallsville and Poolesville, and cross at Edward's Ferry. Stuart would cross neither; instead, he would use White's Ford. (White's Ford should not be confused with White's Ferry, which then was called Conrad's Ferry.) The approaches to the ford on both shores were mere wagon tracks overgrown with weeds (no trace of the roads exist today). This obscure ford was seldom used, even by local farmers, who in normal times could only cross the canal by traveling in a stream bed that passed through a tunnel under the canal about a quarter of a mile above Lock 26. The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, normally unfordable and unbridged, had been broken open by Lee's army on the way to Antietam, and it had not been repaired. It would present no obstacle to Stuart. To reach White's Ford, Stuart was close enough to the other fords, that his column might seem to be moving in either direction.
As Stuart's column approached Barnesville, he came under observation from a Federal signal station on Sugar Loaf Mountain. Below Barnesville, Captain White again came to Stuart's assistance. On the right of the highway, a forest extended for almost two miles. An old, abandoned road led southwestward. If they followed this road, they would emerge onto the main road which led from Beallsville to the mouth of the Monocacy. A half mile up the main road, they would reach the farm road leading to White's Ford. Stuart took the side road and ducked into the woods.
About 8 a.m., the command of Alfred Pleasonton arrived at the aqueduct at the mouth of the Monocacy. Shortly after his arrival, he heard picket fire on the Monocacy-Beallsville road. He reacted cautiously, sending forward two companies of cavalry, followed by four of infantry. This small detachment reached a spur along a tributary called the Little Monocacy. As they came to the creek, they came within sight of bearded horsemen about 200 yards away. This was Stuart himself, who riding with Captain Irving, had just emerged, from the old road onto the main highway. Perhaps it was the blue overcoats some of the Confederates were wearing to warm themselves against the chill October morning which made the Federals hesitate, but Stuart did not. He immediately ordered a charge. The 8th Illinois Cavalry immediately wheeled and galloped back to the protection of their infantry, the 3rd and 4th Maine. Up rode Pelham, with his two guns under Breathed. With his sure eye for terrain, he spotted a ridge which commanded the road of the Federal advance and also the approaches to White's Ford. Stuart for a while personally directed the defense, bringing up dismounted sharpshooters to support the guns. Stuart had no intention of getting embroiled with Pleasonton -- his sole concern was reaching the safety of the Potomac. Thanks to Pelham's screen, the farm track leading to White's Ford was as safe as a covered way. All depended on whether or not the Federals had decided to resist there.
Rooney Lee commanded the Confederate advance. Near an old stone barn, he stopped to reconnoiter, sending scouts ahead to see if the Federals were patrolling the canal or blocking the ford. It was well that he did. About 200 men of the 99th Pennsylvania, under command of Lt. Col. Edwin R. Biles, were there. He had pickets along the canal and had posted men in and above an abandoned stone quarry overlooking the ford and had called for further reinforcements. Lee sent back word to Stuart of this development; Stuart informed him that he must force a crossing. At first Lee thought of using a small holding force frontally while the main body moved around the Federal rear. Then he decided on a ruse. Under flag of truce, he told the Federal commander that he faced all of Stuart's cavalry, that his destruction was certain if he did not surrender within fifteen minutes. No word from the Federal commander. The time up, Lee began to divide his men, when to the amazement of all, Biles abandoned his position. Preceded by one gun, Lee's cavalry began crossing the river. It was about 9:30 a.m.
Meanwhile, Stuart had great concern over his rearguard, under Colonel Matthew Butler. Courier after courier had been sent, but Butler was nowhere in sight. Stuart gave Pelham and the sharp-shooters permission to withdraw by successive stages, holding open the gap as long as possible. Pelham had already sent one gun to the ford; one was with Hampton's brigade, and the other with the rearguard. He unlimbered and took a position on still higher ground about a thousand yards westward. Here he was able to pour an enfilading fire on the flank of Pleasonton's skirmishers as they emerged from the woods and came up the ridge astride the road. He gained fifteen minutes, a vital delay.
Stuart, dismayed at the absence of Butler, came up to Blackford. 'Blackford,' he said, 'we are going to lose our rearguard! ' 'How is that, General?' Blackford asked in surprise. Stuart explained the situation. Blackford offered to try it. Riding up the bank, Blackford passed Pelham, who was rapidly firing alternately up and down the river at the enemy plainly in view. The two men saluted each other, and Blackford settled down in the saddle for a long heat. There was no mistaking the route -- 3000 horses had clearly marked the road. Blackford passed the couriers, who had not dared to go any farther, and Blackford himself was in despair when, unexpectedly, at a sudden turn into the road, he ran right into the rearguard. Blackford quietly took Butler aside and explained the need to hurry. Butler put his command into a gallop, but there was some doubt whether or not he could save his one gun. Much to the delight of all, the horses held out and pulled it to safety. 'We could hear the boom of Pelham's gun in the distance, I wrote Blackford, 'and as long as that continued in action, I knew the way was still open.' With drawn sabres, they dashed toward the ford, ready to cut their way out if necessary. There stood Pelham with his one gun on the towpath of the canal, holding open the gap which they passed through. Pelham followed into the ford and the whole command reached the safety of Virginia.
They had made it! With only one man wounded and another captured. the cost to Stuart had been negligible. In fact. Stuart lost the most personally. His servant Bob, rather fond of drink, had fallen asleep in the road and had been captured. With him were two of Stuart's personal horses. The weary command encamped at Leesburg and then through slow marches went west of the mountains. The Federals did not pursue.
It is amazing that the Federals were unable to intercept Stuart. They had superior numbers. a shorter road network. and a generally friendly population. Brigadier General William W. Averell. with six regiments, was on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at the mouth of the south branch of the Potomac. He knew by 2 p.m., October 10th that Stuart had crossed into Maryland but did not get orders to move until 7 p.m. He waited eight hours and instead of going down river, turned north and marched 55 miles into the mountains of Pennsylvania, not coming to Hagerstown until two days after Stuart was safely back in Virginia.
General Alfred Pleasonton's headquarters were at Berlin (now Brunswick). On the 11th, at 4 a.m., he was ordered to Hagerstown, which he reached before noon. Here he received false intelligence that Stuart was retracing his steps and would recross the Potomac at one of the upper fords, so he started westward to Clear Spring. He was halted after a four mile march and ordered to proceed towards Emmittsburg and Gettysburg, in an effort to intercept Stuart. He reached Mechanicstown (now Thurmont) at 8:30 p.m. Mechanicstown was less than 20 miles from Hagerstown, but Pleasonton had already marched 30 miles the same day. When he reached this point, Stuart was only four miles of him at Rocky Ridge. At Rocky Ridge Stuart had encountered a party of Pleasonton's men, who escaped. It seems that Pleasonton did not receive this information until almost midnight. Also, a company of Rush's Lancers reported seeing Stuart's column pass through Woodsboro about 10:30 p.m. and this was promptly reported. He then set out for the mouth of the Monocacy, which he reached about 8 a.m., October 12th. His march of 78 miles in less than 28 hours left him with only a fragment of his command. So said Pleasonton. But his return of October 10th (4500 present for duty) definitely shows he had more than Stuart's 1800. Pleasonton was sure Stuart would try to cross at the ford at the mouth of the Monocacy. When Stuart charged the Federals on the Monocacy-Beallsville Road, it was not a ruse, but it had that effect.
General George Stoneman also was at fault. He says he did not know that Stuart's column had been sighted at Hyattstown until 9 a.m. He did send out his reserve under Colonel Henry G. Staples. General Hobart Ward rode up and took command. At Beallsville, two civilians told him that 3000 rebel cavalry were coming down from Barnesville. An infantry regiment was posted along with two guns to the right of the road. General Ward was spared from making a decision by the arrival of Major William A. Pitcher of Pleasonton's command. He told him that Pleasonton hesitated to advance because he could not tell whether Ward's people were friend or foe. Apparently, these two forces sat still while Butler slipped through. Later, Ward reached Pleasonton, urged they combine forces and strike the ford. 'You should have been here three hours ago.' Pleasonton snapped. Pleasonton then declined to let Stoneman have any of his cavalry to pursue Stuart across the Potomac. Stoneman had dispersed his forces too thinly, from Seneca to Edward's Ferry. One can sympathize with General George B. McClellan, the Union army commander, when he said, 'I did not think it possible for Stuart to recross, and I believed that the capture or destruction. of his entire force was perfectly certain.'
Stuart enjoyed the plaudits he and his command received, but the biggest disappointment on the raid was the failure to destroy the railroad bridge over the Conococheague. The destruction of this bridge would have forced McClellan to rely excluslvely on the Baltimore and Ohio. It shows poor intelligence that the Confederates did not know the bridge was made of iron. Also, while Stuart came back with 30 hostages, these were comparatively small fry. Judge Kimmell and Colonel McClure, for example, had much more political clout than any sheriff. (A friend of McClure's, one of Stuart's scouts, Hugh Logan, actually advised McClure to go home). This information Stuart could easily have obtained from his good friend, Jed Hotchkiss, Jackson's topographical engineer and a native of Pennsylvania. On the whole, though, Stuart's raid has to be considered a success. That he obtained the information Lee wanted is evident from Lee's report to Confederate Secretary of War George Randolph: 'From information he [Stuart] was able to obtain, I am inclined to believe that McClellan has detached no part of his army eastward, but, on the contrary, has been receiving reinforcements. His main army is west of the Blue Ridge, and stretches from Hagerstown to Rockville, the center resting at Harpers Ferry, with detachments guarding the river.'
In this raid, John Pelham never had more than two guns under his direct command. He showed what one gun, handled with great boldness and speed, could do. His defense of the farm track was essential, as was his defense at the ford itself. Had Blackford not heard the barking of Pelham's single gun, most likely he would have realized that the game was up for Butler's rearguard. Stuart himself helped Pelham in the defense along the Monocacy-Beallsville Road, staying with his favorite gunner as long as possible. As H.B. McClellan said, 'Two spirits more congenial than Stuart and Pelham never met on the field of battle.'
While hazardous, Stuart's 'raid' was necessary to provide Lee with vital information. It was conducted skillfully, and was successful because of boldness, speed and a little bit of luck. The adventure added one more plume to the hat of 'The Knight of the Golden Spurs.'
This article first appeared in Volume 1, No. 2 of The Cannoneer.
Sources:
H. B, McClellan, I Rode with Jeb Stuart.
Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, Vol. 2.
W. W Blackford, War Years with Jeb Stuart.
'An Eyewltness Account,' by R. Channing Price, Civil War Times Illustrated.
'How Stuart Got Back Across the Potomac,' by Col. Wilbur S. Nye, Civil
War Times Illustrated, January 1966.
